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‘Today is only the beginning, it is not the end’ (Irish News  April )
This front-page headline the day after the Good Friday Agreement was reached was
a prophetic warning about the difficulties that would lie ahead in implementing the
negotiated deal.
Introduction
Political conflict and community sectarianism have plagued Northern Ireland’s society
for several generations. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of  April  was seen
by many to be an end-point to this particular period of instability and to herald a new
beginning for the region based on a carefully constructed range of institutions based on
power sharing between the unionists and the nationalists, negotiated through inclusive
consensus. This study seeks to examine the problems and difficulties that emerged after
the GFA and will attempt to answer the questions What went wrong? and Why has this
peace process experienced difficulties and setbacks during the implementation phase?
The central argument presented in this study is that the Northern Ireland example
illustrates that negotiating a political settlement is often more straightforward than
implementing it within deeply divided communities that have experienced violent
conflict. The study will try to illustrate what problems have emerged in the attempts to
implement the institutions of the GFA and explain the wider reasons behind these and
why they have become such difficult sticking points in the peace process.
From Negotiation to Implementation 
To understand the stop–go nature of the GFA it is essential to understand both the
dynamics of the negotiations that led to the agreement and the specific terms of the
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accurately be viewed as a framework for a settlement, setting out a number of institutions
and relationships that could, over time, develop into an agreed settlement that would
be capable of transcending political and cultural differences within Northern Ireland’s
deeply divided society. By viewing it as a framework for, rather than the achievement of,
a settlement, it is easier to understand why it has been beset by so many implementation
problems.
The GFA was the product of a protracted set of often fractious negotiations that were
unique in terms of their inclusiveness and in the extent of third-party involvement. In
terms of their structure, the multiparty negotiations that took place from  until
 were ambitious in terms of the range of conflict parties involved, and in the roles
of the British and Irish governments as well as the US Administration. Achieving any
level of political agreement between both republican and loyalist sets of paramilitary
groups as well as the main constitutional parties (with the exception of the Democratic
Unionist Party, DUP) was no small feat in the context of the history of failed political
dialogue of the past. The inclusive nature of the negotiations was a vital element in
terms of building a constituency of support for whatever agreement was eventually
reached. The importance of this was reflected by the actions of Mo Mowlam, then
British secretary of state for Northern Ireland, who visited the Maze prison during the
latter stages of the negotiations to ‘sell’ the basic GFA architecture to leading loyalist
paramilitary prisoners. This was a serious political risk taken by one of the leading
negotiators, undertaken because of the importance of attaining the agreement of
paramilitary factions to the settlement. This focus on achieving inclusive support for
the negotiated settlement is highlighted by Hampson (), among others, as being
inextricably linked with the chances of successful implementation.
There were two other specific elements of the negotiations that have had a bearing upon
subsequent difficulties in achieving its full implementation. The first concerns the fact
that several key issues (mainly the precise conditions for weapons decommissioning
and the future of policing) were avoided in the negotiations and the details were left
outside the terms of the agreement. Second, in their latter stages, the negotiations were
conducted in a pressurized atmosphere, designed to produce a result, which may have
been better at engineering an outcome than at achieving an agreed settlement. It is also
fair to say that the precise terms of paramilitary weapons decommissioning and the
future structures of policing were left out of the GFA precisely because it was impossible
to achieve agreement on them in .
It was in this necessary ambiguity within the carefully balanced text of the GFA that the
seeds of subsequent difficulties took root. Just what had been agreed by these negotiators
on  April ? Despite the fact that a printed copy of the agreement was delivered to
every home in Northern Ireland in advance of a referendum, to be held as a mechanism
for determining popular support for the terms of the settlement, there was confusion
among many nationalists and unionists over both its terms and its long-term political
implications. This was not helped by the fact that several of the negotiators disagreed
with one another about what the GFA amounted to and provided dramatically differing
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narratives of its terms and conditions. ‘Inevitably, proGFA unionists and nationalists
presented the Agreement to their supporters in very different terms. For unionists it
entrenched the Union and was a disaster for republicans, while for republicans, it was a
further step towards Irish unity’ (Dixon : ). Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator, Martin
McGuinness, defended his party’s acceptance of the new institutions provided for by
the GFA in the following statement: ‘I think the mood all over the island is that moving
into the assembly to further our republican objectives towards our ultimate goal of a
united Ireland is at this moment in time the sensible thing to do’ (BBC  May ).
This comment reflected what many Irish nationalists regarded as an inescapable political
reality, but was far from advancing their constitutional objectives in the sense of Irish
national self-determination. In other words, the GFA was sold to Catholic nationalists
by Sinn Fein as ‘jam today’ in terms of the civil rights agenda, with the promise of
‘jam tomorrow’ in terms of the goal of reuniting the island of Ireland politically. What
McGuinness did not articulate so loudly was that he was prepared to participate in a
British political institution and recognize the constitutional apparatus of the United
Kingdom (UK) in the hope that this would evolve into a form of Irish unity in the
future.
Conversely, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), David Trimble, claimed
a rather different set of outcomes from the GFA in a speech on the  April .
‘The new Agreement reached at Castle Buildings is a disaster for Sinn Fein/IRA [Irish
Republican Amy]. Violent republicanism has failed to “smash the Union”; in fact it has
failed in all its stated objectives. Instead, Northern Ireland’s place within the United
Kingdom has been secured’ (Trimble  April ).
One of the central explanations for the stop–go nature of the peace process from this
point onwards is that there was never an agreement between the main parties either
about the short-term modalities concerning the rate of weapons decommissioning
and the link between this and Sinn Fein’s presence within the GFA’s institutions of
governance, or about the longer-term implications of the GFA for Northern Ireland’s
constitutional position between Britain and Ireland. This lack of clarity can be explained.
The leaderships of Sinn Fein and the UUP came under sustained attack following their
negotiation of the GFA on the basis that this was an unacceptable compromise. The
UUP visibly fractured, with one of Trimble’s senior colleagues at the negotiations,
Jeffrey Donaldson, walking out before the details of the agreement were announced.
Donaldson, along with several other senior party figures, subsequently campaigned
against the GFA for several years in an attempt to change UUP party policy. As Tonge
(: ) has pointed out,  special meetings of the party’s ruling Ulster Unionist
Council (UUC) have been held since , each one narrowly backing the policy of
party leader David Trimble by an average of  per cent to  per cent, indicative of the
divisions within the unionist community.
This succeeded only in destabilizing the party, weakening it vis-à-vis its DUP rivals
and undermining the implementation of the institutions of the agreement. Jeffrey
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unionist opposition to the GFA from within his party and from the DUP acted as a
form of Chinese water torture on Trimble’s leadership of the UUP and was fundamental
to the implementation problems that beset the GFA.
On the other side of the political fence, the Sinn Fein leadership came under attack for
supporting the GFA by radical republicans who disagreed with the above analysis of
Martin McGuinness and viewed the agreement as anathema to traditional republican
objectives. The most violent example of this opposition was provided on  August 
when the dissident republican group the Real IRA exploded a car bomb in Omagh
which killed  people, including an unborn child.
The important point to draw from this is that both Sinn Fein and the UUP were
driven to promote competing narratives of the GFA to justify their support of the
settlement. These narratives differed fundamentally from each other in terms of what
could be expected from the deal and what was expected from the different parties to
the negotiations. Once again, this is not unnatural within the context of an intractable
political conflict that is emerging out of violence. Given these circumstances it was
highly unlikely that either unionists or nationalists would view the GFA (publicly
at least) as a messy compromise that they could reluctantly accept, rather than the
achievement of fundamental objectives that they could readily endorse.
The fact that the negotiators themselves were only giving the GFA two cheers rather
than three was highlighted in their lacklustre campaigns in the referendum during
May . The parties campaigned separately rather than together (indicative of the
fundamental divisions over their reading of the agreement); coherence and energy
only only entered the campaign when an Independent Yes Campaign was formed to
coordinate the messages of the parties supporting the GFA with wider civil society
initiatives. Even during the honeymoon period, therefore, with the ink on the GFA
barely dry, enthusiasm for the settlement was ambivalent, even among its supposed
advocates. As Dixon suggests, ‘Although the Good Friday Agreement had been endorsed
in the referendum by a majority of both Catholics and Protestants, they were each
probably endorsing contrasting interpretations of the Agreement’ (Dixon : ).
The subsequent problems in the implementation of the GFA therefore need to be seen
against the background context of the negotiations, the fact that several important issues
were avoided completely or were drafted ambiguously within the GFA, and the main
political parties’ constructed alternative narratives about what it meant for Northern
Ireland’s constitutional position.
It’s Democracy, Jim, But Not As We Know It 
While it is possible to cite disagreements between the central political actors as being
chiefly responsible for the stop–go nature of the peace process, there is also a view that
the implementation problems that beset the GFA were linked to the unique political
architecture contained in the provisions for a new Assembly.
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The GFA sought to establish a hybrid system of power sharing between unionist and
nationalist political parties to encourage cooperation and consensus between them. The
plan for the Assembly was based on a form of consociational democracy, predicated on
the need for cross-community power sharing between nationalist and unionist parties to
lock both main ethno-national blocs into a positive-sum relationship of interdependence.
Consociational theory was developed by Arend Lijphart in response to the view that
deeply divided societies are not inevitably condemned to violence, and that a significant
role could be played by the character of political institutions in determining whether
such tensions could be contained within the political system (Lijphart ). The GFA
was based on the consociational logic that institutions should be built which primarily
contain and manage societal divisions and that regulate existing sectarian tensions,
rather than attempting (at the outset) to transcend or overcome them. This system of
governance was based on the prioritization of group rights and identities over individual
ones, the premise being that checks and balances in the distribution and exercise of
power had to be woven into the fabric of the institutions, to reflect and obviate the
central political cleavage between Ulster unionism and Irish nationalism.
This produced a form of sectarian mathematics within the new political system where,
to ensure cross-community support, either by parallel consent or by weighted majority,
members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) were required to designate themselves as
‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. This produced the criticism (Taylor ; Wilford and
Wilson ) that the institutions that evolved out of the GFA contained the seeds of
their own destruction by institutionalizing sectarian divisions within the fabric of the
Assembly, rather than transcending or overcoming them. ‘The fundamental problem
with consociationalism is that it rests on precisely the division it is supposed to solve.
It assumes that identities are primordial and exclusive, rather than malleable and
relational: high fences, in other words, make good neighbours’ (Wilford and Wilson
: ). From this perspective, therefore, the implementation problems suffered by
the GFA were rooted in the undemocratic and sectarian nature of the institutions that
were set up as part of the political settlement. Critics of this perspective (O’Leary and
McGarry ; Horowitz ) have, however, argued that the conflict within Northern
Ireland required consociational structures of this type to reflect the dynamic realities
of that conflict and protect the nationalist minority community from domination by
the majority (which was one of the fundamental causes of the conflict after ), and
represented the only viable institutional structures capable of containing the various
tensions between the unionist and nationalist blocs. The consociational nature of the
GFA was an inevitable consequence of the divisions among those who negotiated it,
given that one group defined itself as British and wished to remain constitutionally
within the UK, while the other main bloc viewed itself as Irish, and wanted to break
with the UK.
If these were the starting points of political negotiation, then it is hardly surprising
that the institutional structures of the GFA attempted to contain vastly differing goals
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are political institutions, like those in the Agreement, that cater to the bi-national
nature of Northern Ireland’s society’ (McGarry a: ).
Todd has pointed out that the consociational structure of the new political institutions
was designed to evolve over time rather than act as a barrier to transformation taking
place in the conflict relationships between nationalists and unionists; ‘the consociational
elements exist in the context of an agreement that was conceived holistically, not just
as a stable set of institutions but as institutions that would themselves develop and
transform in the course of their functioning’ (Todd : ). Those who believe that
this consociational structure institutionalizes sectarianism suggest that this lies at the
heart of the reasons why the GFA has not been effectively implemented. ‘It is neither
obvious nor logical that ethno-nationalism can be cured by prescribing more of it through
constitutional engineering. There is no prima facie case to suppose that this will occur’
(Taylor : –). For those who see consociational theory as an inappropriate basis
for political institutions to mediate the ethno-national divisions in Northern Ireland,
the stop–go nature of the peace process since  was unsurprising. How can we
be surprised that sectarian tensions and ethno-national distrust have undermined the
implementation of the GFA when that very logic has been woven into the sinews of the
political institutions that emerged out of it in the first place? Conversely, for those who
regard the consociational nature of the GFA as being an appropriate way of recognizing
existing realities and regulating entrenched ethno-national conflict, the problems of
implementing the GFA lie outside the technicalities of the institutions themselves.
Northern Ireland’s Groundhog Day
Even within the context of Northern Ireland’s fractious political history, the
implementation of the GFA was slow, tortuous and often tedious, with claim and
counter-claim from the unionist and nationalist sides to the effect that one group or
the other was reneging on commitments made in the text of the GFA. The agreement
itself slowly bled to death by a thousand cuts, as the various political parties and other
factions argued around the corpse.
The first difficult issues context of the precise circumstances in which Sinn Fein would
enter the new Executive, which would be drawn from the Northern Ireland Assembly on
the basis of party strength, and how and when paramilitary weapons would be disposed
of. Fundamentally this problem is at the heart of the reasons why the GFA has not been
implemented successfully: the main negotiators, and their respective constituencies, did
not trust one another to keep their part of the bargain. As a result, the wording of the
GFA on decommissioning was picked at like an infected scab, with allegations of bad
faith hurled backwards and forwards from Sinn Fein and the UUP in particular.
The critical paragraph here within the GFA reads as follows:
All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament
of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue
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to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission
[on Decommissioning] and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the
decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement
in referendums North and South of the agreement and in the context of the
implementation of the overall settlement’ (The Agreement: Agreement Reached in 
Multi-Party Negotiations: 20).
It was this tortured paragraph more than any other which holds the key to the
implementation problems experienced by the GFA. The main players in this drama
did not trust one another, despite having negotiated a settlement. The wording of this
paragraph was vague in places and open to interpretation, and, crucially, the paramilitary
groups themselves were not signatories to the GFA. Thus, while the UUP claimed
that Sinn Fein was not working in ‘good faith’ with the Independent Commission on
Decommissioning, or was not using ‘any influence they may have’ with the IRA, Sinn
Fein would respond by claiming that it was doing so and, moreover, that the UUP’s
lack of commitment to the overall structures of the GFA was making it impossible
for Sinn Fein to argue the case for weapons decommissioning. This was a circular
zero-sum argument driven by two negative yet omnipresent features of the post-GFA
period—first, a lack of trust between the two ethno-national blocs (chiefly Sinn Fein
and the UUP) and, second, internal pressure within these blocs (again featuring Sinn
Fein and the UUP) over conceding ground to the other side. For Sinn Fein the central
issue concerned the decommissioning of IRA weapons within the context of a total
disarmament that did not single republicans out for special treatment and that linked
paramilitary weapons with the legally held arms of the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC)/Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the British Army.
The consistent position of Sinn Fein from  onwards was that it wished to see all 
weapons taken out of Irish politics and that the constant prevarication of the UUP
over implementing the GFA in full was making it impossible for Sinn Fein to achieve
its end of the bargain. Needless to say, unionists in general and the UUP in particular
were unconvinced, and believed that Sinn Fein was merely paying lip service to the
decommissioning issue while pocketing ‘gains’ related to the implementation of other
aspects of the GFA, chiefly its presence in the Executive, the creation of the North–
South institutions and the implementation of the Patten Report on policing which saw
the RUC become the PSNI.
The political consequences of this disagreement over weapons decommissioning were
an intensification of internal divisions within the UUP and constant instability in
the peace process more generally, as both David Trimble and the British Government
precipitated repeated suspensions of the GFA institutions. In fact, despite the media
attention that has been given to the issue of IRA weapons decommissioning, there
is no specific connection between this and Sinn Fein’s presence in the structures of
government contained within the GFA. This linkage only occurs if you believe that
the IRA and Sinn Fein are one and the same organization, which of course unionists
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neither the IRA nor the Ulster Freedom Fighters on the loyalist side were signatories to
the GFA, and any movement on weapons decommissioning was defined by them as a
voluntary act of good faith rather than a requirement of the GFA.
This confusion contained within the carefully worded paragraphs of the GFA over
who promised what to whom (and by when) was magnified by particular third-party
involvement during the last-minute negotiations on the deal in April . In an effort
to persuade Trimble to gamble with internal dissent within his party over the precise
terms of weapons decommissioning, British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote to the
UUP leader at the th hour with a series of pledges and to insist that for him weapons
decommissioning was a requirement that had to be adhered to by the paramilitary
factions. Trimble placed much faith in these promises from the British prime minister
but could not avoid the fact that this was the personal position of the prime minister
rather than part of the terms of the GFA itself, and thus held no sway with either Sinn
Fein or the various sets of paramilitary groups.
The political structures set up as part of the GFA have been suspended on four separate
occasions during this period, while the four elections that have taken place have
resulted in a radicalization of the electorate at the expense of the moderate centre.
This has reflected unionist disillusionment with a divided UUP and the peace process
more generally, and growing support within the nationalist community for Sinn
Fein from an electorate incensed by the unionist reluctance to participate fully in the
structures of government agreed in the GFA, aided and abetted by a vacillating British
Government.
More than eight years after the GFA was signed, the blunt fact is that, despite the  per
cent vote in favour of it in the Northern Ireland referendum in , it has failed at
the implementation stage. This failure was caused by insufficient effort being put into
combating the mistrust between the UUP and Sinn Fein and inadequate clarity over
the precise terms of the agreement itself. The UUP had split down the middle following
the GFA negotiations in  and has remained divided ever since, with several of its
leading members being openly opposed to party policy and lobbying against it internally,
as well as during election campaigns. Symbolically, a group of these dissidents resigned
from the UUP when they failed to change party policy over the GFA and joined Ian
Paisley’s anti-agreement DUP. This internal meltdown within the UUP, precipitated
by the GFA, has had predictable impacts in terms of the party’s behaviour and its
electoral fortunes. On the one hand, desperate to achieve some movement over IRA
decommissioning and anxious to satisfy critics within the party, the UUP has caused
the GFA institutions to be suspended on several occasions in a bid to wrestle concessions
out of Sinn Fein and preserve what was left of party unity. This only resulted in further
political crisis and inertia, as Sinn Fein blamed the UUP for a lack of commitment to
the implementation of the political settlement. The other impact of this ambivalent
attitude towards the GFA was electoral decline. While half of the UUP seemed to be in
support of the agreement, the other half appeared to be opposed to it. The DUP took a
much more coherent line of opposition and gradually overtook the UUP as the largest
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unionist party in terms of both number of seats and share of the popular vote. In the
 Assembly elections, the DUP won  seats and  per cent of the vote, compared
the UUP’s  seats and  per cent of the vote.
This reversal of fortune for the UUP was significant for two reasons. First, it indicated
that its divisions over the GFA had damaged its electoral support and that a substantial
number of its supporters were opposed to implementation of the GFA, at least under
the existing conditions. Second, the political architecture of the GFA meant that, as the
largest party in the new Assembly, the anti-agreement DUP had the right to nominate
a candidate from its own party to become the next first minister. Given the fact that
the other major story of the  Assembly election was the strengthening of Sinn Fein
relative to the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), the prospects for reviving the
flagging peace process appeared bleak. As Sinn Fein had become the largest nationalist
party it had the right to nominate its candidate for deputy first minister, holding out
the unlikely prospect of a DUP and Sinn Fein team as first and deputy first ministers
of a new Assembly and Executive.
While repeated efforts have been made to resurrect the GFA, the political structures
that were central to it (most notably a functioning Assembly and Executive) have been
suspended since  October . Since this date the structures of the GFA have only
had a nominal existence and Northern Ireland has been governed by direct rule from
Westminster. While a new round of talks took place from September to December
 in an attempt to revive the GFA, a conclusive deal remains elusive. Although some
progress was made between the DUP and Sinn Fein during this phase of negotiations,
the initiative ended in failure. Once again, the central reason for this failure related
to a lack of trust between the parties to the conflict. While movement on weapons
decommissioning by the IRA seemed possible, in return for a more robust set of
institutions that could not be so easily suspended, the DUP demanded photographic
evidence of the decommissioning process before it was willing to enter the Executive
alongside Sinn Fein. The IRA was reluctant to grant this and by December  the
initiative had collapsed in mutual recriminations, sparked off by DUP leader Ian
Paisley’s comment that the IRA should ‘wear sackcloth and ashes’ and demonstrate
‘repentance’ for its past actions.
This illustrated once again that there had been little transformation in the attitudes
of the conflict parties towards one another since the GFA was reached in ; old
enmities had been preserved (and in some cases had been intensified), with many
unionists viewing the IRA (and by extension Sinn Fein) as unreconstructed terrorists,
while republicans viewed the unionist community as reluctant partners in the peace
process who were intent on undermining it.
Events that Damaged the Peace Process
Aside from the on-again-off-again nature of the political structures, a number of specific
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mistrust, generating mutual recriminations and fuelling the collapse of the peace
process. On  October , the PSNI raided Sinn Fein’s offices at Stormont as part of a
police investigation into alleged intelligence-gathering operations by the IRA. This was
a highly public event which embarrassed Sinn Fein and resulted in the UUP forcing the
British Government to suspend devolved government on  October. This raid and the
subsequent arrest of a leading Sinn Fein member for ‘possessing documents likely to be
of use to terrorists’ allowed unionists to make a connection between Sinn Fein and the
IRA, as well as fuelling the unionist perception that republicans were not committed
to totally democratic methods. The fact that this public raid on Sinn Fein was not
accompanied by a significant amount of evidence, or by a prosecution nearly three years
later, has led many nationalists to believe that this was a cynical attempt to blacken
the reputation of Sinn Fein and undermine the peace process and the institutions
of the GFA. Notwithstanding the dearth of evidence, the PSNI raid on Sinn Fein’s
Stormont offices served to further strengthen the unionist view that republicans were
not committed to exclusively peaceful methods and could not therefore be trusted in
the devolved structures associated with the GFA.
Unionist trust in Sinn Fein’s bona fides continued at a nadir at the end of  following
a massive  million GBP robbery of the Northern Bank in Belfast on  December.
Responsibility for the largest bank raid in UK history was laid squarely at the door
of the IRA by the PSNI, and by leading politicians in Britain and Ireland, with the
inference that if the IRA had carried it out, then the leadership of Sinn Fein must also
have been aware of it. Hugh Orde, chief constable of the PSNI, was quick to lay the
blame for the robbery at the door of the IRA. ‘In my opinion the Provisional IRA were
responsible for this crime and all main lines of inquiry currently undertaken are in that
direction’ (BBC  January ). Despite an IRA statement denying any involvement
in the robbery, few unionists were inclined to believe them, not least because Irish Prime
Minister Bertie Ahern seemed happy to take the PSNI chief constable at his word: ‘An
operation of this magnitude . . . has obviously been planned at a stage when I was in
negotiations with those that would know the leadership of the Provisional movement’
(BBC  January ). While, significantly, no evidence has yet been produced by the
PSNI that links the IRA with this robbery, perceptions are all-important, and Sinn
Fein has been damaged by such allegations, as has the peace process more generally.
The Northern Bank robbery was followed by the murder of Robert McCartney,
allegedly by members of the IRA, in the Short Strand area of Belfast on  January
. McCartney’s murder heaped further pressure on the IRA and Sinn Fein over
allegations that republicans had attempted to cover up the murder and had pressurized
witnesses not to come forward to the police with information. McCartney’s sisters
led a public campaign to assist the PSNI investigation that involved a public rally in
Belfast, worldwide media appearances and an invitation to the US White House to
meet US Senator Edward Kennedy and President George W. Bush on St Patrick’s Day
( March ). These meetings provided disastrous public relations for Sinn Fein,
as Gerry Adams was not invited to meet either Kennedy or Bush, and the contrasting
treatment of Adams and the McCartney sisters was a deliberate and highly symbolic
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slap in the face for the republican movement. This event cast the IRA (and its defenders)
in the role of community parasites rather than community defenders, and such criticism
coming from within its own community was a bruising experience for the Sinn Fein
leadership. While the IRA issued a statement threatening to shoot those responsible for
McCartney’s murder, this was rejected by the family. Given that the IRA was supposed
to be on a ceasefire, and committed to the peace process, this offer to murder its own
‘volunteers’ responsible for the McCartney murder was an alarming development to
many. British Secretary of State Paul Murphy declared that ‘there is no place for those
who signed up to the Good Friday Agreement for the sort of arbitrary justice and
murder that is being suggested here’ (BBC  March ). The DUP leader, Ian Paisley,
called for the leaders of Sinn Fein to be arrested following the IRA statement. ‘The offer
to shoot those responsible for the murder of Robert McCartney confirms again that
terrorism is the only stock and trade of Sinn Fein/IRA’ (BBC  March ).
While Sinn Fein denied any knowledge of this murder or any attempt by republicans
to cover up the evidence or suppress statements to the police, few people within the
unionist community were inclined to believe it.
These events were emblematic of a more endemic malaise in the peace process, namely
the total lack of trust between the main ethno-national blocs, both at the community
and at the elite political levels. The architecture of the GFA played some part in this,
in that its institutions and procedures (e.g. parallel consent) tended to recognize
and nourish ethno-national differences rather than transcending them. The British
Government also has some responsibility here, as its repeated interventions to suspend
the structures of the GFA acted as a safety net for nervous or recalcitrant unionists,
and provided no sense of collective responsibility that went beyond the zero-sum
ethnic equations. In short, it has allowed politicians (and the wider public) in Northern
Ireland to squabble like children in the knowledge that the adults will intervene when
the fighting gets too serious and restore order. ‘The existence of this failsafe device
[suspension of devolved powers] has perhaps not focused the minds of politicians in
Northern Ireland hard enough on making the institutions work within the existing
framework and has allowed the creation of crises in which one could prove that one
remained a true believer in the cause, Republican or Unionist’ (Wolff : ). It has
also been suggested that the personalities of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahearn, and their habits of pragmatic deal-making, were more
suited to the negotiations that led to the GFA than to the difficulties surrounding its
implementation. ‘The governments have tended to act as power-brokers, swaying to
different pressures, rather than as upholders of an agreement . . . These skills and habits
allowed the leaders to broker agreement in the first place. They were, however, less
suited to the process of implementation, which required more formal respect for the
principles of the agreement. Instead, government actions encouraged power-play within
the institutions of the agreement’ (Todd : ).
The GFA has failed to be implemented because there was never a clear agreement about
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is sufficiently afraid of what will happen if and when it fails. Muddling through and the
‘cold peace’ of direct rule from London, closely linked with British–Irish cooperation
and internal reforms within Northern Ireland, has proved to be most people’s least
worst option. However, the troubled implementation of the GFA does not mean that
political progress has not taken place in Northern Ireland since .
Conclusion
While the stop–go nature of the peace process has been frustrating for many of its
supporters, the picture is not completely bleak, despite the inertia associated with the
establishment of the institutions associated with the agreement. Behind the headlines of
the GFA’s various implementation problems, significant changes have nonetheless been
taking place in Northern Ireland since  that hold out the possibility of progress in
the future. Crucially among these, all the major political parties, including Sinn Fein,
now accept that Northern Ireland will remain within the UK for as long as a majority of
the people living in the region wish to do so, and the main paramilitary factions show no
desire to return to violence in pursuit of their political objectives. By endorsing the terms
of the GFA and enthusiastically playing their part in the political institutions derived
from it, Sinn Fein has de facto made Northern Ireland a ‘successful political entity’.
Pro-GFA unionists, meanwhile, have recognized that Northen Ireland is not exactly the
same as other regions within the UK, and even the DUP are not seriously quarrelling
with either power sharing or a North–South dimension in principle. While Sinn
Fein has recognized Northern Ireland as a political reality to be reformed/terminated
by democratic means, unionists (even those critical of the GFA) have accepted the
principle of devolved government based on power sharing with an Irish dimension. In
other words, despite the implementation problems plaguing the GFA, its basic political
geometry has been accepted by the vast majority of people living there.
While ethno-national divisions remain, and have in some cases have become entrenched,
the divisions between unionists and nationalists have narrowed significantly, and
revolve around emotional issues such as mistrust and bitterness rather than the political
mechanics of the GFA itself, or indeed disagreements over the constitutional sovereignty
of Northern Ireland. While the success of the DUP and Sinn Fein at the  Assembly
elections seems to preclude progress, it does provide inter-ethnic stability for future
agreements, as it is unlikely that either the SDLP or the UUP would be willing (or able)
to undermine any agreement that was reached. There are signs that beyond the rhetoric
both the DUP and Sinn Fein are preparing their parties and their wider constituencies
of support to enter government together. At the  Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (annual
convention), for example, there was evidence that the party was laying the groundwork
for Sinn Fein’s entry onto the Policing Board of the PSNI, with more traditional
republican motions criticizing British ‘crown forces’ being heavily defeated. Similarly,
the DUP now regularly participates in television debates that include members of Sinn
Fein (which it would have boycotted in the past) and Ian Paisley himself visited Dublin
for meetings with the Irish Government in . So there are signs that the main
protagonists have been tiptoeing slowly towards one another despite the ongoing inertia
with the implementation of the GFA.
 International IDEA
Nevertheless, as a framework for political settlement, the GFA has so far failed to impact
upon the grass-roots communities in Northern Ireland, especially in urban interface
areas where community conflict is most acutely experienced. As Todd has argued,
the institutions of the GFA became assimilated into old patterns of interaction, where
the revolutionary innovations of the agreement were not matched by similarly radical
changes in the wider political context within which the GFA and its institutions tried to
operate (Todd : ). The GFA, for instance, had very little to say about community
sectarianism, focusing more upon elite-level political institutions, and as a consequence
it has lacked relevance at the grass-roots level. This is illustrated by the fact that, despite
the existence of the GFA and the long-standing paramilitary ceasefires, the number of
non-fatal shootings rose from  in  to  in  (Wolff : ) while in 
there were  punishment shootings and beatings (Tonge : ).
The key difference between these statistics on violence and those before  is that
after  most violence was directed inwards by paramilitary groups and generated by
intra-ethnic rivalries, rather than directed outwards across the ethno-national divide.
In this sense, the political conflict within Northern Ireland as previously defined (zero-
sum ethno-national dispute between two polarized blocs) is in its death throes, but
violent conflict remains and will do so for the foreseeable future. This is both predictable
and natural given the past  years of low-intensity warfare and sectarianism within
the region. It is within this context that the peace process in Northern Ireland should
be assessed, where moving out of conflict is seen as a complex, difficult and long-term
process, where setback rather than breakthrough is the norm. Given this set of more
realistic performance indicators, the stop–go nature of the Northern Ireland peace
process begins to look less disappointing and perhaps provides a more realizable way
forward for the future.
Notes
1. During a pre-referendum speech and photo-opportunity on 20 May 1998, Tony Blair unveiled
the following handwritten pledges to the people of Northern Ireland, intended to sway nervous
unionists to support the terms of the agreement. ‘I pledge to the people of Northern Ireland:
• No change in the status of Northern Ireland without the express consent of the
people of Northern Ireland.
• Power to take decisions returned to a Northern Ireland Assembly, with accountable
North/South co-operation.
• Fairness and equality guaranteed for all.
• Those who use or threaten violence excluded from the Government of Northern Ireland.
• Prisoners kept in unless violence is given up for good’.
2. The DUP’s manifesto for the 2005 Westminster general election, entitled ‘Leadership That’s
Working’, focused on what it was demanding from Sinn Fein before devolution is restored to
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Appendix 
Chronology of Events Since 1998
10 Apr. 1998 Good Friday Agreement is concluded and published
10 May 1998 At a special conference in Dublin, Sinn Fein votes to change its
constitution, ending its abstention policy and allowing its candidates to
take seats in a new Northern Ireland Assembly
22 May 1998 Referendums on the Agreement in Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland. In this first all-Ireland poll since 1918, 71 of people vote for the
GFA in Northern Ireland with 28 voting against it. The turnout is 81.
In the Irish Republic, 94 vote in favour with only 5 voting against it
and a turnout of 56 of the electorate
25 June 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections are held, to a new 108-member
Assembly
1 July 1998 First meeting of the ‘Shadow’ Assembly and election of David Trimble
as first minister-designate and Seamus Mallon as deputy first minister-
designate. This is referred to as the shadow assembly as powers have not
yet been devolved to it from Westminster
15 Aug. 1998 29 people are killed following a bomb explosion in Omagh. The bomb
was planted by the Real IRA and was the single worst incident in 30
years of conflict in Northern Ireland
29 Nov. 1999 The Northern Ireland Assembly meets, triggering the d’Hondt
mechanism and the nomination of 10 ministers to the Northern Ireland
Executive
2 Dec. 1999 Devolved powers formally pass from Westminster to Belfast and the new
Executive meets for the first time
11 Feb. 2000 After 72 days, the Assembly and Executive are suspended by British
Secretary of State Peter Mandelson due to lack of detailed timetable
from the IRA on weapons decommissioning
6 May 2000 The IRA releases a statement saying that it is willing to begin a process
that would ‘completely and verifiably’ put its weapons beyond use
27 May 2000 UUP leader and First Minister David Trimble secures his party’s support
to re-enter power-sharing Assembly and Executive with Sinn Fein
despite the absence of IRA weapons decommissioning
30 May 2000 The devolved powers suspended in February are restored to Northern
Ireland
23 Oct. 2001 The IRA begins weapons decommissioning, in its own words, ‘in
order to save the peace process’, in an act verified by the Independent
Commission on Decommissioning as ‘significant’
4 Nov. 2001 New Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) formally comes into
being, replacing the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
4 Oct. 2002 Sinn Fein offices at Stormont are raided by the PSNI as part of alleged
investigation into an IRA intelligence-gathering operation. The UUP
subsequently theatens to walk away from the Assembly unless action is
taken by the British Government
14 Oct. 2002 British Secretary of State John Reid announces the suspension of
devolved government and the return of direct rule
 International IDEA
1 May 2003 British Prime Minister Tony Blair announces the postponement of new
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly because of a lack of clarity
over the IRA position on decommissioning
26 Nov. 2003 The delayed Assembly election finally takes place. The DUP and Sinn
Fein emerge as the largest parties within unionism and nationalism
3 Feb. 2004 A review of the working of the Good Friday Agreement begins at
Stormont, involving all the major political parties
18 Sep. 2004 Three days of intensive negotiations at Leeds Castle end with the
parties failing to secure an agreement over the restoration of devolved
government
4 Oct. 2004 DUP leader Ian Paisley has a landmark meeting in Dublin with the Irish
Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern. This is the first time the DUP has officially met
an Irish prime minister in Dublin
29 Nov. 2004 Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams holds first-ever meeting with Chief
Constable of the PSNI Hugh Orde
20 Dec. 2004 The largest bank raid in UK history takes place at the Northern Bank in
Belfast where over 26 million GBP is stolen. The PSNI, as well as senior
members of the Irish Government, place responsibility for the robbery
on the IRA, although the IRA denies any involvement. Despite such
allegations, no charges have get been brought against any members of
the IRA in relation to the robbery
30 Jan. 2005 Robert McCartney, a Catholic from the Short Strand area of Belfast, is
murdered in a bar, allegedly by members of the IRA. This murder and its
alleged cover-up by republican sympathizers cause huge embarrassment
for Sinn Fein
17 Mar. 2005 Senator Edward Kennedy and President George Bush meet Robert
McCartney’s sisters in Washington and refuse to meet Gerry Adams,
who is also in Washington as part of the St Patrick’s Day celebrations
5 May 2005 The date set for the Westminster general election
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